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Albanian Citizenship Configurations  
in the Balkans  
Gezim Krasniqi* 
This paper examines the Albanian state–nation constellation in the Balkans in the light of the European 
Union (EU) integration process with a focus on citizenship configurations in Kosovo and Albania. It 
addresses an important puzzle: why legal norms of citizenship do not follow the emerging practice of 
stronger trans-border co-operation in the Albanian ethnic and cultural space. The study shows that the 
process of EU integration is the key to understanding and explaining this puzzle, for it provides an 
opportunity for ‘constructive ambiguity’ around which both ethnic and statist brands of Albanian na-
tionalism, as well as various elite fractions, can coalesce and coexist. In a wider context, Albanian 
citizenship configurations are shaped by the ever-evolving complex relationship between nation, state 
and Europe.   
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Introduction 
This paper examines the Albanian state–nation constellation in the Balkans in the light of the European Union 
(EU) integration process, focusing on citizenship configurations in Kosovo and Albania. As a multistate nation, 
Albanians are in the majority in the independent state of Albania and in the contested state of Kosovo, and are 
minorities in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, all of which aspire to join the EU. The paper focuses on the 
Albanian communities in the Balkans as an example of those having a ‘structurally ambivalent membership status, 
belonging by residence and (in most cases) by formal citizenship to one state and by putative ethno-national affinity 
to another’ (Brubaker 1996: 56). The paper considers Kosovo–Albania citizenship configurations and emerg-
ing symbolic citizenship practices among Albanians in the region that are grounded on ethno-national princi-
ples of unity and belonging and which transcend state borders; at the same time it addresses an important 
puzzle – the fact that the legal norms of citizenship do not follow the emerging practice of stronger trans-border  
co-operation in the Albanian ethnic and cultural space. The paper argues that the process of EU integration is 
the key to understanding and explaining this puzzle, since it provides an opportunity for ‘constructive ambi-
guity’ around which both ethnic and statist brands of Albanian nationalism, as well as various elite fractions, 
can coalesce and coexist. 
 The paper argues that Albanian citizenship configurations are largely determined and shaped by incongru-
ous legal provisions (largely civic and inclusive laws) on the one hand and (often) ethnically selective practices 
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on the other. Based on the criteria of acquisition and loss of citizenship, Albania and Kosovo represent expan-
sive citizenship regimes with strong elements of ethno-cultural and territorial inclusion. In a wider context, 
Albanian citizenship configurations are shaped by the ever-evolving complex relationship between nation, 
state and Europe. 
As a result of major political and citizenship transformations that followed the fall of communism, state 
disintegration and subsequent state building, citizenship policies and regimes in the region have been in  
a constant state of flux and have produced practices both of inclusion and exclusion. In the last quarter of the 
century the region witnessed not only the breakdown of the old order and violence, but also the creation of 
new, interdependent states, polities and citizenship regimes, as well as the processes of European integration 
(Shaw and Štiks 2012). Moreover, the application of citizenship policies that were based on different and 
specific criteria of membership has led to various manifestations of ‘uneven citizenship’, i.e., exclusionary 
legal, political and social practices but also other unanticipated or unaccounted for results of citizenship poli-
cies (Krasniqi and Stjepanović 2015). 
Likewise, the establishment of new states, migration and refugees, as well as policies of ‘ethnic selectivity’ 
(Žilović 2012), have led to new patterns and practices of ‘external citizenship’ or ‘trans-border citizenship’ 
and ‘citizenship constellations’. External citizenship refers to the ‘status, rights and duties of all those who are 
temporarily or permanently outside the territory of a polity that recognises them as members’ (Bauböck 2009). 
On the other hand, trans-border membership involves ‘political claims, institutionalised practices, and discur-
sive representations oriented to or generated by a population that is durably situated outside the territory of  
a particular state, yet is represented as belonging in some way to that state or to the nation associated with that 
state’ (Brubaker and Kim 2011: 22). While the former is usually employed to analyse the relationship between 
states and actual or former citizens that live abroad (temporarily or permanently), the latter concept is wider 
and often includes the relationship between the state and its ethnic kin living in the neighbouring countries. 
Last but not least, a ‘citizenship constellation’ is ‘a structure in which individuals are simultaneously linked to 
several such political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political 
authority, but by several’ (Bauböck 2010: 848). In other words, as a result of the increasing proliferation of 
dual and multiple citizenship, individuals in the modern world are often legally tied to more than one polity or 
state. It is against this backdrop of complex transformations and the emergence of new patterns of citizenship 
definition that this paper sets out to analyse Albanian citizenship configurations in the region of the Balkans. 
The first part of the paper discusses the citizenship configuration model as well as methodology. It then 
proceeds with a detailed analysis of citizenship acquisition and loss provisions in the case of Kosovo and 
Albania. The third section focuses on citizenship practices and other symbolic citizenship patterns in the re-
gion. The last section discusses Albanian citizenship configurations in the context of the EU integration pro-
cess. 
Approach and methodology 
Citizenship as a key organising principle of modern political life is, above all, a status that creates a legal bond 
between individuals and a polity/state and endows these individuals with certain rights and obligations. Citi-
zenship is a multidimensional concept encompassing status (membership in a political entity), rights (individ-
ual or group-differentiated rights) and identity (Joppke 2007). Another dimension of citizenship refers to 
practices of active participation in political life and civic virtues (Bauböck 2001). 
Vink and Bauböck (2013: 5–6) propose a new typology that distinguishes between purposes, functional 
components and dimensions of citizenship regimes. According to them, citizenship laws serve five purposes: 
intergenerational continuity (the purpose of securing population and state continuity through birthright and/or 
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descent); territorial inclusion (determining inclusion/exclusion criteria through naturalisation policies); singu-
larity (avoiding multiple citizenship); special ties (securing citizenship for groups that are perceived as belong-
ing to the society, polity or nation by virtue of their cultural, political and economic special ties); and genuine 
link (avoid ‘over-inclusion’ by providing for a loss of citizenship in cases where individuals are no longer 
connected to a state). These are all ways in which states use citizenship legislation to define and regulate 
relations with their respective citizens. Functional components, which serve these key purposes of citizenship 
laws, mean legal provisions regulating acquisition and loss of citizenship status. Last, citizenship regimes are 
differentiated along two main dimensions: territorial and ethno-cultural. This implies that laws are shaped by 
multiple purposes and require a comprehensive analysis, rather than an assumption that they can all be divided 
according to the underlying principles of civic or ethnic inclusion/exclusion. 
 Nonetheless, citizenship purposes and functional components are not static. They evolve over time as citi-
zenship policies are clearly influenced by the agendas of domestic political actors that propose different inter-
pretations of state interests, as well as regional dynamics and international constraints. In addition to the 
resident population, Vink and Bauböck’s approach to citizenship regimes takes into account populations of 
former citizen residents and their descendants, as well as broader ethnoculturally conceived kin populations. 
The application of such an approach enables us to provide a more detailed picture of the various dimensions 
of citizenship regime in Albania and Kosovo, and to compare and contrast them, as well as place them in the 
wider regional context. 
As regards discussions on non-legal, cultural and political aspects of the wider Kosovo–Albania relation-
ship in the context of regional and European integration, the paper utilises Ole Waever’s (2002) theoretical 
framework conceptualising three key ideas about the state, nation and Europe and how these concepts are 
linked in political discourse in a coherent narrative that underpins a country’s foreign policy and policy towards 
Europe and the EU. 
 By combining the configurations and constellations approaches, on the one hand, and Waever’s framework 
on nation–state–Europe, on the other, this study aims at shedding light not only on the specific purposes and 
functional components of citizenship regimes in Albania and Kosovo, but also on the relationship between 
state and nation in the case of trans-border Albanian communities in the Balkans. As such, it departs from 
many existing studies that focus within existing nation-state borders and ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wim-
mer and Schiller 2003) in general. As far as methodology is concerned, comparisons are made using Schep-
pele’s (2004) approach of ‘constitutional ethnography’, which involves the ‘study of the central legal elements 
of polities using methods that are capable of recovering the lived detail of the politico-legal landscape’. This 
approach embraces nation, culture and the overall politico-legal context. 
Albania and Kosovo citizenship regimes: past and present1 
Albania and Kosovo differ substantially both in terms of history of statehood and citizenship policies. Whereas 
the Albanian polity and its citizenship regime were mostly shaped by internal developments in the country 
throughout the twentieth century, Kosovo represents a clear case of external state building and it remains  
a contested state and territory. Notwithstanding these important differences, the two countries’ citizenship 
regimes are rather similar when it comes to citizenship indicators related to acquisition and loss of citizenship. 
Albanian citizenship legislation has changed relatively little over time. Since the country’s independence 
in 1912, Albania has experienced three different citizenship eras, each of them corresponding to the different 
political regimes in place. Albania’s first citizenship legislation dates from the inter-war period (the 1929 Civil 
Code of the Kingdom of Albania). After the Second World War and the communist takeover, a new law on 
Albanian citizenship was enacted in 1946 followed by a decree in 1954. This decree was in force for almost 
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half a century – until 1998 – when the most recent law on Albanian citizenship was adopted. The present 
citizenship legislation in Albania largely complies with international standards of political and social inclusion. 
The present legislation also reflects Albania’s attempts to democratise and achieve EU membership. Some 
of the main principles of the European Convention on Nationality, which it ratified in 2002, including the 
obligation to reduce and eliminate statelessness, are incorporated into the new citizenship law. In addition, for 
the first time in its history, the Albanian citizenship legislation allows dual citizenship. Certainly, this reflects 
the new reality created in Albania and the region after the fall of communism and the increase in migration 
flows. The 1998 law also lacks ethno-centric formulations and provisions and is gender balanced when it 
comes to the naturalisation of spouses and children. 
Until recently, the Albanian citizenship regime was one of the last remaining regimes in Southeastern Eu-
rope that did not apply the post-territorial principle of ethnic selectivity, i.e. policies of diaspora inclusion 
premised on a de-territorialised, ethnic conception of citizenship (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). Despite the 
fact that the Albanian state is surrounded by more than two million ethnic Albanians living in the neighbouring 
states of Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, the Albanian citizenship regime has historically 
been based on the principles of territory and residence and not on ethnicity. The 1998 Albanian Law on Citi-
zenship both allows dual citizenship and contains no ethno-centric formulations and provisions (although the 
Albanian state has occasionally extended some citizenship rights related to education to its co-ethnics in the 
region), a fact that has been widely praised by international organisations and seen with suspicion and a certain 
sense of disappointment by Albania’s co-ethnics in the successor states to Yugoslavia. 
However, following a 2013 decision by the Albanian government, the country was on course to join other 
neighbouring states in granting citizenship to co-ethnics living in neighbouring states and to the wider Albanian 
diaspora, based on ethnic selectivity criteria. Despite the change of government in the June 2013 elections, the 
outgoing government of Sali Berisha adopted decree no. 554 on ‘Procedures for the Recognition and Acquisi-
tion of Albanian Citizenship by Persons of Albanian Origin, Excluding Citizens of the Republic of Kosovo’ 
on 3 July 2013, which, if applied, would have enabled more than one million Albanians in the region and 
diaspora to claim Albanian citizenship (Krasniqi 2013). However, although the decree remains in force, the 
current socialist government has made it clear that it has no intention of implementing it, insisting that the 
issue of citizenship is regulated by the 1998 law alone. 
The Kosovan citizenship regime, on the other hand, which has been largely drafted by international organ-
isations and diplomats present in Kosovo at the time of independence, is still in the process of consolidation. 
It reflects the principles of multi-ethnicity and inclusiveness enshrined in the Ahtisaari Plan (which laid the 
foundations of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence), the Declaration of Independence and the Kosovan 
Constitution. The new Kosovan Constitution, by refusing to recognise exclusions, loyalties or claims of an-
cestral rights, not only defends the universalist values of civic republicanism and individual liberalism, but 
also speaks out for group (community) rights and defends their exclusivity and group-differentiated rights 
(Krasniqi 2012c, 2015). Certainly, in the case of Kosovo, on the one hand there is a de-ethnicisation of state 
institutions, but, on the other, the multi-ethnic composition of society is reflected in its politics. 
In terms of the procedures, the basic characteristics of the Kosovan citizenship law are a combination of 
ius sanguinis (‘right of the blood’; citizenship based on descent) and ius soli principles (‘right of the soil’; 
citizenship based on territory), prevention of statelessness (lack of citizenship), absence of provisions granting 
ethnic preferences, and gender equality of parents deciding the naturalisation of children, as well as gender 
equality between spouses. Another crucial characteristic of this law is the unconditional recognition and ac-
ceptance of dual and multiple citizenship. An even more particular characteristic of the citizenship law is that 
Articles 28 and 29 contain some transitional provisions regulating acquisition of citizenship by Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia citizens who were Kosovo residents before 1 January 1998 and habitual residents of 
Central and Eastern European Migration Review  5 
Kosovo (1999–2008). Persons belonging to the first category can become citizens of Kosovo by registration 
whereas those belonging to the second category become Kosovan citizens ex lege. Though this law anticipates 
facilitated naturalisation for people from the diaspora, it does not define or differentiate them on the basis of 
ethnicity. According to the law, all people (and their descendants within one generation) who are legally resi-
dent in foreign countries and who can prove that they were born and/or maintain family ties in Kosovo are 
considered to be members of the Kosovan diaspora. 
The law was, however, amended in 2011, roughly at the same time as the adoption of the new law on 
foreigners. These amendments introduced two substantial changes in the law on citizenship. The first concerns 
the residence criterion for naturalisation, which has been increased from five to ten years, making the Kosovo 
law one of the strictest in the region regarding naturalisation of aliens. The other change is related to the status 
of stateless people. Several paragraphs were added regarding acquisition of citizenship by stateless people, 
widening the scope of the law with the aim of reducing statelessness. 
 In what follows, using Vink and Bauböck’s configurations model, the paper looks into the five main pur-
poses of citizenship in Albania and Kosovo: intergenerational continuity, territorial inclusion, singularity, spe-
cial ties and genuine link. 
Intergenerational continuity 
Securing the intergenerational continuity of the state through birthright attribution of citizenship ius sanguinis, 
ius soli or some combination of both principles is the most basic purpose of all citizenship laws (Vink and 
Bauböck 2013: 9). Albania and Kosovo are similar in the way they provide intergenerational continuity 
through a combination of territorial and lineage principles. 
In Albania, acquisition by birth is determined in Articles 7 and 8 of the citizenship law. Based on Art. 7, 
everyone born of at least one parent with Albanian citizenship acquires Albanian citizenship automatically. In 
this case, both the principles of descent (ius sanguinis) and the gender equality of parents are applied. A child 
born in Albania of unknown parentage or found within the territory of the Republic of Albania would acquire 
citizenship under the ius soli principle; otherwise it would become stateless (Art. 8, para. 1). However, if one 
of the child’s parents becomes known before the child reaches the age of 14, and he or she holds foreign 
citizenship, Albanian citizenship can be relinquished at the request of his lawful parents, provided that the 
child does not become stateless as a consequence of this action (Art. 8, para. 2). The ius soli principle is also 
applied in the case of a child born within the territory of the Republic of Albania to parents holding another 
citizenship who are lawful residents in the territory of the Republic of Albania, provided that both parents give 
their consent (Art. 8, para. 3). 
 Based on the principle of descent, a child acquires citizenship automatically when both their parents have 
Kosovan citizenship (in this case ius soli does not apply). However, if on the day of the child’s birth only one 
of the parents is a citizen of Kosovo, the child may acquire Kosovan citizenship under the following conditions: 
a) the child is born in the territory of Kosovo (here we have a combination of ius soli and ius sanguinis prin-
ciples); b) the child is born abroad and one parent is stateless or his or her citizenship is unknown; and c) the 
child is born abroad and only one parent has Kosovan citizenship but both of them give their consent before 
the child reaches the age of 14. In cases when the consent of parents is needed, the law has retroactive effect. 
The ius soli principle applies in cases of unknown or stateless parents of a child born or found in Kosovo. 
However, if one of his/her parents who does not have Kosovan citizenship is found before the child reaches 
the age of 7, upon the parent’s request, citizenship of the child may be forfeited. The territorial principle is also 
applied in cases when a child is born in the territory of Kosovo and his or her parents have foreign citizenship 
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but permanent residence status in Kosovo and, most importantly, give their consent. So, here we have a con-
ditional application of the ius soli principle, in that the consent of parents is crucial in this case. Acquisition of 
citizenship by adoption is based on the principle of descent and a child adopted by parents who have Kosovan 
citizenship acquires the same rights as a natural child. But the law is not explicit in determining cases of 
adoption when only one parent is a Kosovan citizen. 
Voluntary renunciation of citizenship is permitted in both countries. Both have experienced successive 
waves of emigrations, which have led to a growing number of citizenship renunciations by emigrants who 
acquire citizenship of host countries. Between 2009 and 2015, some 32 000 people renounced Kosovan citi-
zenship (Matoshi and Kostanica 2015). However, in the case of Kosovo release may be refused if the applicant 
is a civil servant, judge, public prosecutor, or a member of the police service or Kosovo Security Forces, or 
when the release is considered to be against the interests of the state. In Albania, in order to avoid statelessness, 
the decision on renunciation will be revoked if the person does not acquire another citizenship within a rea-
sonable time. 
Territorial inclusion 
Both countries have similar conditions when it comes to territorial inclusion of foreigners in the citizenry. The 
only notable difference concerns residence criteria, which is higher in Kosovo (ten years) than Albania (five 
years). 
In cases of regular naturalisation in Albania, a foreigner who has submitted an application for acquisition 
of Albanian citizenship by naturalisation may acquire Albanian citizenship if he or she fulfills the following 
requirements: they have been lawfully resident in Albania for at least five continuous years, possess a dwelling 
and sufficient income, have not been sentenced in any country for a criminal offence that carries a prison 
sentence of three years or more (exemption only if the sentence was given for political motives), demonstrate 
elementary knowledge of the Albanian language, and pose no danger to the security and defence of Albania. 
There is no condition relating to cultural assimilation. 
Similarly, in the case of Kosovo, to quality for regular naturalisation a foreigner should have been resident 
in Kosovo for five consecutive years after receiving a permanent residence permit (which in turn takes five 
years), demonstrate respect for the constitutional and legal order of Kosovo and integration into society, have 
sufficient means of living without resorting to social assistance schemes, fulfil all financial obligations to the 
state, and demonstrate an elementary knowledge of one of the official languages of Kosovo (Albanian or Ser-
bian) and of its culture and social order. 
Singularity 
Vink and Bauböck distinguish stronger and weaker versions of singularity – the unambiguous and unique tie 
between an individual and the state that precludes multiple citizenship. A stronger version of singularity im-
plies general avoidance of multiple citizenship. A slightly weaker version of singularity allows for sequentially 
multiple citizenships over the course of an individual’s life, but not for simultaneous ones. A third and even 
weaker version of singularity (present among European states) allows for multiple citizenships acquired by 
birth, but not by naturalisation. The two functional components of singularity include the condition to renounce 
former citizenship before naturalisation and loss of citizenship due to voluntary acquisition of another citizen-
ship. Neither Kosovo nor Albania possess such conditions. Both countries allow dual and multiple citizenship, 
in large part due to the need to maintain links with the large emigrant populations abroad. 
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Special ties 
Citizenship laws may also be used to secure citizenship for groups that are perceived as belonging to the soci-
ety, polity or nation by virtue of their special ties, independently of their legal citizenship status. The two 
functional components of acquisition of citizenship based on special ties are cultural affinity and reacquisition 
by former citizens. 
 Whereas the Kosovan citizenship law does not permit naturalisation based on cultural affinity, the Albanian 
one does. The 2013 government decree 554 was aimed at securing Albanian citizenship for people of Albanian 
origin. According to the decree, in order to qualify for Albanian citizenship, an individual should: 1) be  
a citizen (or documented resident) of an EU member state, the United States of America or another state the 
citizens of which are not required to hold a visa to travel in the states belonging to the Schengen Area; or  
2) possess another citizenship or be stateless and have one parent who is an Albanian citizen; or 3) possess 
another citizenship or be stateless and born in Albania. Most importantly, this decree excludes Kosovan citi-
zens of Albanian origin, as well as descendants of those who were Albanian citizens during the Second World 
War (when Albania’s borders were extended by the Italian occupier to include most of today’s Kosovo and 
Macedonia). Yet, as mentioned above, there is no evidence to suggest either that the decree is being imple-
mented or that it has been revoked by the current government in Albania. 
 However, special cultural ties have been combined with special achievement in sports and culture to allow 
ethnic Albanians from the region to acquire Albanian citizenship. This has become a practice falling within 
the exceptional naturalisation category, applied in cases when the Republic of Albania has a scientific, eco-
nomic, cultural or national interest. In this case, it is the President of the Republic who, based on a proposal 
from a ministry or other state organ for exceptional merits and contribution to the state of Albania, grants 
citizenship to an alien. So far, based on this clause, many politicians, artists and sportsmen from Kosovo, 
Macedonia and the diaspora have acquired Albanian citizenship. The most prominent case is that of the Alba-
nian national football team, which is dominated by players of Kosovan origin, fast-tracked through the natu-
ralisation procedure (Ames 2016). 
 In sum, both the Albanian and Kosovan citizenship laws provide for reacquisition of citizenship by former 
citizens through facilitated naturalisation, meaning that they do not have to fulfil all the regular criteria for 
naturalisation. 
Genuine link 
According to Vink and Bauböck, the withdrawal or lapse of citizenship after long-term residence abroad con-
strains membership by means of a ‘genuine-links’ criterion. It means that citizenship is lost in cases where 
individuals are no longer connected to a state in such a way that their individual interests can be seen as linked 
to those of the state. In other words, long residence abroad can be interpreted by state authorities as lack of  
a genuine link, leading to the lapse or withdrawal of citizenship. 
Neither Kosovo nor Albania apply the genuine-links criterion: its application would have serious conse-
quences for both countries due to the large numbers of their citizens living and working abroad. However, 
despite being emigrant countries, Albania and Kosovo have very weak legal ties with their respective diasporas 
and, unlike many countries in the region, do not allow voting in their embassies abroad (although Kosovo 
allows voting by mail) or representation of the diaspora in the parliament. Yet both countries have recently 
taken steps to strengthen links with their respective diasporas. Kosovo established a Ministry for the Diaspora 
in 2011 and is currently organising a census to collect data relating to Kosovans who live abroad. Similarly, in 
2016 the Albanian government organised the first Albanian Diaspora Summit and pledged to strengthen its 
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ties with the diaspora through the establishment of the National Council of the Albanian Diaspora and to or-
ganise a census that would, among other things, pave the way for remote voting for Albanians abroad (Vata 
2016). Moreover, the two governments are cooperating in support of supplementary Albanian language edu-
cation for diaspora children as well as by opening joint consular services in a number of European cities, 
including Munich and Milan. 
 In summary, the functional components of citizenship laws in Kosovo and Albania have similar basic pur-
poses, combining ethno-cultural and territorial elements. In the context of Vink and Bauböck’s typology, Al-
bania and Kosovo represent expansive citizenship regimes with strong ethno-cultural and territorial inclusion 
elements. Yet, as we will discuss in the following section, existing civic provisions do not always follow the emerg-
ing practice of stronger trans-border co-operation and symbolic citizenship based on ideas of ethno-national be-
longing and unity. 
Citizenship practices, trans-border co-operation and symbolic citizenship 
The incongruence of political and ethno-cultural borders in the Western Balkans, together with conflicting 
nationalist projects and understanding of nationhood and statehood, has caused many ethnic groups to have, 
to paraphrase Brubaker, a ‘structurally ambivalent membership status’, often belonging by formal citizenship 
to one state and by putative ethno-national affinity to another. This is above all the case for minority groups, 
who often identify with a neighbouring (kin)state, which provides them with partial or full citizenship rights. 
 As discussed above, neither Albania nor Kosovo, as states with an overwhelming Albanian majority, has 
extended citizenship rights to ethnic Albanian minority populations in the region. Nevertheless, since the re-
moval of the Yugoslav/Serbian control in Kosovo in 1999 and Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008, 
both states have undertaken a number of symbolic formal and informal steps to facilitate closer integration of 
the people on the both sides of the border, while maintaining their separate legal and political identity. Despite 
the fact that Albanians in the Balkans are legally tied to separate state institutions, the majority perceive them-
selves to both at one and the same time belong to an indivisible part of the Albanian nation in the Balkans and 
be citizens of their respective state. Thus as a result of state and non-state forms of co-operation in various 
fields, a new political and cultural reality has emerged in the region in the form of a distinct politico-cultural 
sphere or neighbourhood. The ‘Albanian neighbourhood’ in the Western Balkans is bound together by ‘interest 
solidarity’ in the fields of the economy, infrastructure, education and culture, and media and communications 
(Philips 2012). 
As with many countries in transit or unconsolidated democracies, there is a discrepancy between the legal 
framework and political practice. For instance, Albania has regularly extended partial citizenship rights to its 
ethnic kin in the region, mostly in the form of quotas for students from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro 
studying in Albania. The Albanian government quota for Albanian students from the region for the 2015/2016 
academic year was 600 (Ministria e Arsimit dhe Sportit 2016). Likewise, when a visa regime was in place 
between Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which also included Kosovo), Yugoslav passport 
holders of Albanian ethnicity were exempt from the regime. More recently, the Albanian government adopted 
a decision to exempt from work permit ‘citizens of the Republic of Kosovo and Republic of Serbia of Albanian 
ethnic belonging’ (Government of Albania 2014, my emphasis). Although the decision does not establish ex-
plicit criteria for determining Albanian ethnicity, in practice, it is done on the bases of self-declaration and 
ethnic markers such as name and language competence. 
The governments of Kosovo and Albania have undertaken a number of initiatives to facilitate communica-
tion across the borders. These include investment in infrastructure and the building of a highway that cut the 
distance between the two capital cities significantly, a plan to create a single labour market by removing tax 
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barriers and work permits, the creation of a single energy area, establishment of an integrated border system 
to ease movement of people and goods, as well as standardisation and integration of educational (standardisa-
tion of pre-university curricula and textbooks; harmonisation of academic degree standards) and cultural insti-
tutions (co-sponsoring of a joint cultural events calendar). Integrated institutions like schools are expected to 
instil a society’s goals, values, and traditions into their students, and to teach a common language. Equally, 
freedom of movement has improved between Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro with all 
the countries enabling border crossing with ID cards. 
 In addition to state-led co-operation initiatives, many private initiatives in the field of media, culture, music 
and business have emerged, seeking to profit from the presence of a substantial Albanian-speaking group in 
the region to establish trans-border/regional festivals, digital media platforms and businesses. Yet, the most 
symbolic pan-Albanian institution of all is the Albanian national football team, which includes players origi-
nating from Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and the diaspora and is supported by fan clubs from across 
the region. The first ever qualification of the Albanian national football team for a major international tourna-
ment (European Championship 2016) turned the team into a symbol of national unity for Albanians worldwide. 
 Notwithstanding these intra-Albanian (cultural) integration trends, citizenship regimes of states where Al-
banians live do not overlap significantly, with dual citizenship an exception and not a norm. Likewise, prolif-
eration of political centres, vested political, economic and criminal interests, and religious identification 
(Blumi and Krasniqi 2014) all act as centrifugal factors, often countering various political initiatives. Moreo-
ver, this new sphere, the emergence of which has alarmed some neighbouring states and raised the prospect of 
‘Greater Albania’ (Austin 2004; The Economist 2007), is not self-sufficient and insulated. Rather, it is firmly 
embedded in and overlaps with other national cultural spheres such as the Serb cultural sphere, regional cul-
tural spheres such as ‘Yugosphere’ (Judah 2009) and the wider European sphere. 
 The remainder of this paper focuses on the role of the EU integration process in the transformation of the 
relationship between citizenship, borders and identity. In addition to the legal framework analysed above, in 
order to understand these countries’ policies towards the EU as well as domestic perceptions of state and nation 
and where they fit into the regional and international political scene, we should examine various discursive 
dynamics present in these countries, how concepts of statehood and nation relate to ideas about Europe and 
how they are transformed in concrete policies towards ethnic kin in the region, regional states and the EU. 
State–nation–Europe constellation 
The relationship between nation and state has been re-conceptualised and reconfigured both normatively and 
practically as a result of the impact of the European integration process, in particular following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Ole Waever (2002) has come up with a theoretical framework that conceptualises three key ideas 
about the state, nation and Europe in an attempt to explain how these concepts are linked in political discourse 
in a coherent narrative that underpins a country’s foreign policy and policy towards Europe in the shape of the 
EU. According to Waever’s framework, at the most fundamental level are discourses about the nation and the 
state – concepts that set the basic parameters of political discourse and policy in the country. At the next level 
these concepts are linked to each other and to Europe, creating the discursive space for making and debating 
specific policies towards Europe and the EU, which comprise the last, third layer of analysis. In what follows 
we consider the state–nation–Europe constellation in the case of Albanians in the Balkans using Waever’s 
framework. 
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‘One state – one nation’ versus ‘one nation – two states’ debate 
The relationship between state and nation among Albanians is a complex one and cannot be fully compre-
hended without understanding the origins of Albanian nationalism in general and that in Yugoslavia in partic-
ular, as well as the internal power struggles within it. Lacking any longstanding state-tradition or political 
centre, Albanian nationalism in the Ottoman Empire emphasised the distinctive common origin as well as 
culture and language of the Albanian population in the Balkans. Thus, the Albanian concept of nation is based 
on the ethno-cultural understanding (Kulturnation) and due to the historical incongruence between nation and 
state, it sees them as separate entities. The fact that after the Balkan Wars the Albanian state was deprived of 
areas with large Albanian majorities, most significantly the Kosovo region (Jelavich 1983: 101), resulting in  
a situation when roughly half of the Albanian population was left outside of the borders of the new Albanian 
state (Puto 2009: 81), was essential in the creation of the political and nationalist narrative of ‘an artificially 
and unjustly divided nation’. 
 Following the creation of an independent Albania, which included only about half of the Albanians living 
in the region, two distinct and opposing nationalist threads emerged: a state-centred one and a nation-centred 
one (Rama 2004: 522). Whereas both threads had an ethnic understanding of the nation, they differed on 
whether consolidation of the state or nation had priority. The nation-centred vision was championed mainly 
by Albanian leaders in the territories left outside the Albanian state. As a result, many Albanian nationalist 
groups and movements, especially the underground ones, aimed throughout the existence of the Yugoslav state 
at unification of all Albanian-inhabited lands with the state of Albania. Despite the fact that the demand for 
equality in the form of a Kosovo Republic within socialist Yugoslavia was the predominant slogan in the 1968 
and 1981 protests in Kosovo, a Republic of Kosovo was perceived by underground nationalist organisations 
as only the first step towards unification with Albania, thus making the Kosovan Albanian nationalist move-
ment a ‘secessionist-merger movement’ (Heraclides 1991: 2). 
 However, with the creation of the Kosovan ‘parallel state’ in the 1990s, which was a reaction by Kosovo 
Albanians to the forceful abolition of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989, the Kosovan nationalist movement 
was split into two opposing camps. On one side was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and other parties 
around it, which had a more state-centred and civic political vision of the future of Kosovo. While LDK’s 
political vocabulary was dominated by the concept of popular self-determination with a constant reference to 
Kosovo’s autonomous status in former Yugoslavia, various underground organisations, operating mainly from 
the diaspora, and later on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), campaigned for unification of all the Albanian-
inhabited regions with the state of Albania. Yet, although the initial aim of the KLA was to liberate all the 
Albanian-inhabited lands in the former Yugoslavia and unite them with Albania,2 due to the need to gain in-
ternational support, by mid-1998 they joined the LDK in demanding a Kosovan state instead. 
 Similarly, in the post-war period, Kosovo was characterised by a power struggle between the two national-
istic Albanian discourses that relied on traditions of peaceful and armed resistance respectively. Nonetheless, 
although, as Ingimundarson (2007: 118) has observed, there was an open tension ‘between a modernist civic 
Albanian nationalist discourse based on state building and Western integration, on the one hand, and the  
anti-Serbian ethno-nationalistic discourse symbolised by the armed resistance, on the other’, EU and NATO 
integration took pride of place in the list of political goals of the Kosovan Albanian parties. Moreover, during 
the period of international administration, Kosovan politicians worked closely with the UN, EU and NATO 
missions in Kosovo to build structures of governance that seemed to mirror those of other European democra-
cies (King 2010: 128). The perception that state and nation are divided did not change after Kosovo’s Decla-
ration of Independence either. In large part this is due to the fact that, based on its legislation, Kosovo is  
Central and Eastern European Migration Review  11 
a ‘post-national state’ where state membership and identity are, using Joppke’s (2007: 44) terminology, ‘struc-
turally decoupled’, with the state being unable to impose a particular identity on its citizens. Today, Kosovan 
Albanians are divided between a minority who promote the idea of a separate Kosovan nation and those who 
think that Kosovan Albanians are at the same time both an indivisible part of the Albanian nation in the Balkans 
and Kosovan citizens. 
 These debates surface occasionally, sometimes but not always provoked by internal political events. Most 
recently, journalists, politicians and sportspeople were engaged in a heated debate on national versus state 
identity sparked by a sporting event. The establishment of a Kosovan football team following Kosovo’s mem-
bership in UEFA and FIFA in 2016, as well as the decision of a number of players to switch from Albania (as 
well as other European teams) to Kosovo, sparked debates on identity, belonging, statehood and sports (Mon-
tague 2016). On the one hand, proponents of the idea of a united national football team denounced the idea of 
a Kosovan national team on both sports grounds (weakening of the ‘national’ football prowess and potential) 
and political/identitarian grounds (rejection of of the idea of a separate Kosovan national and/or political iden-
tity). Some went so far as to label those players who switched sides ‘traitors’. On the other hand, proponents 
of Kosovan statehood defend the idea of a Kosovan national team and see it as a great achievement for the 
country and its struggle to establish political legitimacy at home and abroad. 
In general, mainly due to international intervention and administration, the main political parties in Kosovo 
have moved3 from the concept of ‘one nation – one state’, to that of ‘one nation – two states’. An eventually 
independent Kosovo was seen as a positive development for the whole ‘Albanian nation’ in the Balkans. More-
over, the Kosovan self-concept came to be closely linked to the concept of ‘Euro-Atlantic’ integration and 
values. 
United in Europe: the EU as the promised land of a divided nation 
Modern Albanian nationalism in the Balkans is closely connected to the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration 
and values, not least because it needs the European Union and NATO for economic and military security 
respectively. The fall of communism and the emergence of a post-Cold War order, dominated by the European 
integration processes, was a key factor in the re-articulation and redefinition of the state–nation–Europe rela-
tionship among Albanians. In the case of Albania, which experienced 50 years of isolation and oppression by 
the communist regime, the EU became both a political goal and a popular destination for migration of some 
one million Albanians (mostly to Greece and Italy) who left after the fall of the regime (Chiodi 2005; Mai 
2008). 
 On the other hand, the EU and its project of enlargement provided new opportunities for Yugoslav Albani-
ans to project themselves politically without becoming a fully-fledged nation-state. This happened also due to 
Europe’s potential of providing minority nationalist movements with the opportunity to rearticulate the nation 
internally by projecting it externally as part of the European family (Keating 2009: 24). The main Kosovo 
Albanian leader of the 1990s, Ibrahim Rugova, made constant references to the idea of European integration 
in articulating his peaceful democratic cause: ‘Our idea for a peaceful and democratic solution for Kosovo, in 
fact, is a universal and European idea that pleases us, because through this idea, Albanians joined the contem-
porary integrative European philosophy…’ (Reka 1991). Therefore, he dismissed the idea of national unifica-
tion with Albania on the grounds that it contradicts European values and norms. 
Even now, Kosovo’s leaders perceive adherence to European values and eventual EU membership as of 
added value to the state itself. In fact, Article 6 of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence contains the follow-
ing formulation: ‘For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European 
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family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the Eu-
ropean Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion’. This unambiguous formulation reveals not only that the Kosovan Albanian people regard the Kosovan 
state and Europe as complementary but also their concrete plans to achieve EU membership. In fact, the abso-
lute majority of Albanian political parties in the region, both in countries where Albanians form a majority and 
where they are in the minority, are pro-European and committed to EU integration (Stratulat 2014). Similarly, 
Albanian people in the region demonstrate very high levels of support, up to 90 per cent, for the process of EU 
integration of the states where they live (Toshkov, Kortenska, Dimitrova and Fagan 2014). 
As regards the definition of Europe among Albanians in the region, the former is perceived both as an 
intergovernmental body that would certainly benefit their states, and as a system of values, where Albanian 
people belong. Support for EU integration is strong even in the face of the overall economic and political crisis 
that the EU is undergoing, especially in the aftermath of the Brexit vote in 2016. Albania is knocking at the 
door of the European Union – eagerly waiting to start accession negotiations – despite the shadow of Brexit. 
According to Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, his country’s relationship with the EU is akin to a love 
affair: ‘We’re in a kind of affair. (…) We hope to start negotiations for the marriage, and we hope that the EU 
is there when we’re ready to be the bride’ (Farago 2016). 
With respect to the relationship between Europe and the state–nation constellation in Kosovo and Albania, 
the former is not perceived as a threat to the state–nation bond, but rather as an opportunity, both in the sense 
of protection of the national culture and of the state’s pursuit of power. Irrespective of the fact that references 
to a pan-Albanian nation were quintessential elements of the independence movement in Kosovo, in the after-
math of Kosovo’s independence Pristina is emerging as a major centre of power and reference in what is 
loosely defined as the ‘new Albanian space’ (Vickers 2008: 14) in the Balkans. As a result of this, as well as 
Kosovo’s constitutional constraints and due to the overall international and regional political context, the idea 
of unification of all Albanians in one state has been gradually modified into an idea of ‘unification in Europe’. 
Thus, ‘unification in Europe’ has become the new mantra of Albanian institutional and political leaders in the 
region. 
Yet, irrespective of the fact that the idea of Albanian national unification has been replaced with the vision 
of unification in a larger and borderless economic and political union (EU) in mainstream politics, the prospect 
of ‘Greater Albania’ has been occasionally invoked by Albanian leaders in response to the EU’s increasing 
reluctance to accelerate the process of EU accession of the Western Balkan states. In 2015, in a joint interview 
with the then Foreign Minister of Kosovo and current President, Hashim Thaçi, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi 
Rama did not rule out ‘classical unification’ if the EU continued to keep its doors shut for Kosovo and Albania. 
‘The unification of the Albanians of Albania and Kosovo... is inevitable and unquestionable. (…) The question 
is how it will happen. Will it happen in the context of the EU as a natural process and understood by all, or 
will it happen as a reaction to EU blindness or laziness’ (Bytyçi and Robinson 2015). Although these words 
caused concern in the region and in Brussels, their significance was quickly downplayed by Hashim Thaçi, 
according to whom, ‘We are not talking about changing borders at all, but rather about reducing their visibility, 
according to the European model, so that people can move freely. We will all belong to that European space 
one day’ (Poznatov 2015). 
In addition to the normative impact of the European idea, the EU has also played a major role as an anchor 
for economic and political reforms in Albania and Kosovo, including assistance in drafting the key pieces of 
legislation that regulate citizenship. In the case of Kosovo particularly, the EU together with the US have been 
actively involved in state building, democratisation and putting in place a modern system of citizenship, thus 
shaping the nature of the polity. In many ways, EU conditionality has become the main driving force for 
reforms in these countries. 
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Although the prospect of integration of the Western Balkans in the EU is remote, the idea of unification in 
Europe also implies political unification under the institutional umbrella of the Union, as well as unification 
within a single European citizenship. This, the politicians argue, would render existing political borders and 
the obstacles they pose, practically irrelevant. Yet, due to the current political climate within the EU and re-
gional developments, the process of EU integration remains complex, uneven and unpredictable. Already there 
exist different degrees of rapprochement with the EU, with Montenegro and Serbia negotiating their actual 
membership, Macedonia and Albania having gained the status of candidate countries but unable to open ne-
gotiations and Kosovo, at the end of the queue, having just concluded the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment (SAA) with the EU. So, were the Western Balkans countries to continue with the same pace of integration 
into the EU, the first autochthonous Albanian citizens to join the EU could be the ones from the peripheries, 
i.e., those from Montenegro and Serbia. 
 In sum, the EU has played a major role in reconfiguring Albanian nationalism(s) and understandings of 
statehood, nationhood and sovereignty in the region. The European integration process has been influential 
both in terms of the idea of European identity and citizenship and in serving as an anchor of political and legal 
reforms in Kosovo and Albania. 
Conclusion 
This paper has addressed an important puzzle when it comes to the Albanian citizenship configurations, where 
legal norms of citizenship do not follow the emerging practice of stronger trans-border co-operation in the 
Albanian ethnic and cultural space. The analysis of the incongruous legal provisions (largely civic and inclu-
sive laws) on the one hand and (often) ethnically selective practices on the other, has demonstrated that the 
process of EU integration is the key to understanding and explaining this puzzle. Crucially, the EU integration 
process provides an opportunity for ‘constructive ambiguity’ around which both ethnic and statist brands of 
Albanian nationalism, as well as various elite fractions, can coalesce and coexist. While EU conditionality has 
been instrumental in the emergence of civic legal norms regulating citizenship, the promise of EU integration 
and the idea of unification within a larger European political, cultural and economic sphere and citizenship has 
been used by elites in Kosovo and Albania to foster trans-border co-operation grounded on principles of shared 
ethnolinguistic belonging and identity. 
The paper argued that closer institutional and cultural co-operation among the states with Albanian popu-
lations in the region, and above all between Kosovo and Albania, as well as commitment to the EU integration 
process, has played a significant role in the transformation of the relationship between state, nation, borders 
and citizenship, decreasing the significance of state borders and once mutually exclusive citizenship regimes. 
In particular, the idea of European integration, which remains a strategic goal of almost all the Albanian parties 
and political actors in the region, and its practice of borderless co-operation, integration and European citizen-
ship, has been instrumental in this direction. 
Regarding the legal aspects of citizenship, in both Kosovo and Albania citizenship laws have similar basic 
purposes and indicators of functional components, which combine ethno-cultural and territorial elements. Ko-
sovo’s citizenship regime is territorially inclusive and ethnically less selective, something that is largely due 
to its history of state building and strong international presence. In the context of Vink and Bauböck’s typol-
ogy, despite different histories of state building, Albania and Kosovo are very similar, representing expansive 
citizenship regimes with strong ethno-cultural and territorial inclusion elements. 
More widely, the paper has shown that citizenship laws and regimes can be best analysed and understood 
not just by looking into specific provisions regarding acquisition and loss of citizenship, but also by investi-
gating the existing configurations (by focusing on purposes and indicators of functional components), as well 
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as political practices, state–nation constellations, and wider regional and European dynamics. Moreover, the 
paper shows that citizenship configurations are not set in stone. Rather, they are dynamic and ever changing 
in accordance with internal political changes, trans-national co-operation and European integration processes. 
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Notes 
1 This section relies extensively on EUDO country reports on Albania (Krasniqi 2012a) and Kosovo (Kras-
niqi 2012b), as well as the EUDO Citizenship (2015) database. 
2 KLA’s oath began with these words: ‘As a member of the KLA, I vow that I will fight for the liberation 
of Albania’s occupied lands and their unification…’ Likewise, the first point of KLA’s political pro-
gramme, published in April 1998, states: ‘KLA comprises the unity of the Armed Forces of Kosovo and its 
occupied regions and it aims to liberate and unite Albania’s occupied lands’ (Pettifer 2012: 188). 
3 A major exception to this stance is a political organisation called the Self-Determination Movement, rep-
resented in the Kosovan Parliament since 2011 (becoming the third biggest party), whose campaign was 
based on an anti-international supervision and unification with Albania platform. This party promotes  
a pan-Albanian platform (one nation – one state) and dismisses Kosovo’s new state symbols as ‘non-Alba-
nian’ (www.vetevendosje.org). 
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